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THE NATIONAL ENERGY CONSERVATION
POLICY ACT: AN EVALUATION
LEE SCHIPPER,* JACK M. HOLLANDER,*
MARK LEVINE,* and PAUL P. CRAIG**

In October 1978, Congress passed the National Energy Conservation Policy Act (NECPA),' a landmark piece of energy conservation
legislation. This act sets out a large and diverse array of measures
intended to promote energy conservation in all three sectors of U.S.
energy use: buildings, industry, and transport. It is important for
energy planning purposes to make quantitative assessments of the
potential impact of this legislation on U.S. energy consumption, and
to monitor that impact on a continuous basis. This brief review has
the more modest objective of setting out qualitatively the basis from
which more detailed analyses can be developed. We examine:
1. The principles behind and objectives of the act;
2. The methods by which the act seeks to meet its objectives; and
3. The extent to which these objectives are likely to be met.
I. PRINCIPLES AND OBJECTIVES OF NECPA
Title 12 sets out the rationale for energy conservation that underlies NECPA. Congress found that:
(1) The United States faces an energy shortage arising from increasing demand for energy, particularly for oil and natural gas, and
insufficient domestic supplies of oil and natural gas to satisfy
that demand;
(2) unless effective measures are promptly taken by the Federal
Government and other users of energy to reduce the rate of
growth of demand for energy, the United States will become
increasingly dependent on the world oil market, increasingly
vulnerable to interruptions of foreign oil supplies, and unable to
provide the energy to meet future needs; and
(3) all sectors of our Nation's economy must begin immediately to
significantly reduce the demand for nonrenewable energy resources such as oil and natural gas by implementing and main*Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, University of California, Berkeley.
**University of California, Davis.
1. National Energy Conservation Policy Act, Pub. L. No. 95-619, 92 Stat. 3206 (1978)
(codified in scattered sections of 12, 15, 23, 42 U.S.C.A.).
2. 42 U.S.C.A. §8201 (Supp. 1979).
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taining effective conservation measures
for the efficient use of
3
these and other energy sources.

Title I further sets out the purposes of the act, which are "to provide
for the regulation of interstate commerce, to reduce the growth in
demand for energy in the United States, and to conserve nonrenewable energy resources produced in this Nation and elsewhere, without
inhibiting beneficial economic growth." 4
The first finding is a conventional statement of the U.S. energy
problem, expressed in terms of an "energy shortage." It completely
ignores the economics of energy supply and demand. Of course,
there exists some (higher) price of energy at which domestic supply
and demand would be equal; the real problem pertains more to what
levels of energy price and government intervention would be socially
acceptable, how fast the social/economic system can adjust, and
what economic, social, and political values are attached to reducing
the growing U.S. dependence on foreign oil. The first finding would
be more accurate if the phrase "at historical low and decreasing
prices" were added.
The second finding, that "effective measures" are necessary to
prevent an increasing dependence on foreign oil, is without contest.
Here the question is what constitutes effective measures. The major
policy issue in this finding regards the degree to which measures on
the demand, as contrasted with the supply, side of the energy equation can be relied on to alleviate the problem. Only recently a
prominent political group stated that the United States must produce
its way out of the energy problem.' The role of energy conservation
is neither widely understood nor fully accepted.
The third finding calls for an actual reduction in demand for nonrenewable energy resources such as oil and gas, as opposed to a
slowing in the growth rate of that demand. Such a goal is certainly
possible, but its attainment over the next several decades will require
a vigorous and sustained conservation program, as well as substitution of nuclear or coal-generated electricity for many of today's uses
of liquid fuels. Among the energy-demand futures examined by the
National Academy of Sciences' CONAES study, 6 the only scenarios
3. Id. (emphasis added).

4. Id.
5. Statement attributed to a member of the Texas Railroad Commission, as quoted in
NEWSWEEK, April 18, 1977, at 73.
6. U.S. NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON
NUCLEAR AND ALTERNATIVE ENERGY SYSTEMS (1979). See Demand and Conservation Panel of the Committee on Nuclear and Alternative Energy Systems, U.S. Energy
Demand: Some Low Energy Futures, 200 SCIENCE 142 (April 14, 1978) (hereinafter cited
as C.O.N.A.E.S.), for a summary of the Demand and Conservation Panel. Other panel
reports are Supply/Delivery, Risk/Impact and Synthesis/Modeling.
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showing a constant or declining use of liquid fuels were those in
which fourfold increase in energy prices by 2010, as well as strong
government conservation measures, were assumed. Total U.S. energy
use continues to grow in almost all CONAES scenarios, although per
capita use declines significantly in the high-conservation scenarios.
Despite these difficulties with the congressional findings, NECPA's
statement of purpose well expresses a principal goal of energy conservation: "to conserve nonrenewable energy resources produced in this
Nation and elsewhere, without inhibiting beneficial economic
growth." 7 Realization of this goal depends on the degree to which
growth in energy use can be separated from growth in GNP, over
different time periods. The link between energy and economic
growth has been a major issue for energy conservation policy, and
there is considerable disagreement about the nature and magnitude
of this link. We adopt here a generalized economic definition of
energy conservation, which allows a reference against which to
measure the goals and possible impacts of NECPA. Conservation
means using energy in a manner consistent with maximizing welfare.' Principally in response to rising costs and prices of energy,
energy users will find less costly substitutes for energy, over time.
This may involve some changes in behavior, for example choosing to
set thermostats back at night and using more blankets, in the short
term, and choosing to live closer to the place of work, in the longer
term. Consumers will seek lowest-cost solutions to the ownership of
energy-using equipment such as automobiles and appliances, by
taking into account lifetime capital and operating costs.
Even at today's prices, there is much room for energy conservation
as defined here. There will be even more at tomorrow's higher prices.
Indeed, there is evidence that energy use was not economically efficient in the past, for a variety of reasons. 9 Several studies, using
engineering, economic, and behavioral analyses, have concluded that
conservation could provide substitutes for energy at increasing rates
such that energy demand will grow much more slowly than the economy as a whole.' 0 This conclusion is particularly evident when each
7. National Energy Conservation Policy Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 8201 (Supp. 1979).
8. This is developed in Schipper & Darmstadter, The Logic of Energy Conservation, 80
TECH. REV. 41 (January 1978) and Schipper, Another Look at Energy Conservation, AM.
ECON. REV. (PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS) (May 1979).
9. Reasons include lack of information, diffusion of the market incentive because the
investor or builder does not pay bills, management or worker practices. See C. Blumstein, B.
Kreig, L. Schipper & C. York, Institutional and Social Barriers to Residential Energy Conservation (1979) (report prepared for the Council on Environmental Quality, LBL-8299,
Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, Berkeley).
10. C.O.N.A.E.S., supra note 6. See also 1 THE TRANSITIONAL STORM (Edison Electric Institute ed. 1977). Presented is a collection of essays, generally inveighing against
energy conservation.
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energy end use is examined separately from an engineering, economic, or behavioral viewpoint, although it is often unclear when
only aggregate demand elasticities are studied.
NECPA should be judged in terms of the most important issues of
conservation. In our view, these issues are:
" How much energy can be saved?
* How quickly can energy be saved?
" At what cost can energy be saved?
From a strictly economic viewpoint, the goal of a set of conservation
measures such as NECPA contains would be to establish incentives to
encourage energy conservation based on the concept of the present
value of energy savings, or maximizing utility over a variety of behavioral options and costs.' 1 In contrast, from a political viewpoint,
the goal might be to specify particular conservation targets that are
higher (or perhaps lower) than economic optima, or are implemented
more rapidly than economics alone would dictate. Indeed, some
present-day political policies (e.g., low energy prices) work against
energy conservation. NECPA avoids specifying energy consumption
targets for the nation as a whole. (In Sweden by contrast, a goal of
two percent yearly growth in end-use energy was set by law.' 2 ) By
not specifying an energy growth rate, NECPA avoids evaluating energy savings to an end in itself.
Much of the text of NECPA is vague in that its provisions are
specified only in general terms. Perhaps this is necessarily so. How
can the "right" amount of conservation be specified? Even though
related administration documents I 3 state or imply methods for
carrying out present-value calculations, what discount rates, energy
price inflation rates, or energy prices are to be used? NECPA implicitly suggests that these often are best- determined locally for the
legislation to be truly effective. Some would argue, however, that the
discount rate should be a matter of national as well as local concern.
While the inclusion of the words "economic" or "economically
feasible" is a feature of NECPA, language defining these terms is
lacking. The reason, of course, is that there is no widely agreed upon
definition of conservation. Everyone favors conservation in principle,
as reflected in the goals of the act,' ' but there is much less agreement over specific measures. Thus, it is extremely important that the
11. Schipper & Darmstadter, supra note 8.
12. Riksdagen, Energiehushaallning MM. (Energy Bill), 1975 Session, Stockholm: Liberfoerlag.
13. BEPS Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Energy Performance Standards for
New Buildings, 43 Fed. Reg. 54,511-54,616 (1978).

14. 42 U.S.C.A. §8201 (Supp. 1979).
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economic nature of conservation be made explicit. Failure of the
administration to proclaim the economic advantages of conservation,
especially during the months surrounding the original introduction of
the act in April 1977, has led to the subsequent difficulties in passage
faced by legislation governing conservation. Recall that conservation
was defined as "sacrifice" by the President in 1977 and 1978.1 ' By
contrast, the President's recent attempt to decontrol oil prices now
puts him in a position to advise energy users that conservation will
help them minimize the impact of higher prices.
Given this refreshed perspective on conservation, some economists
are nonetheless skeptical about the need for government action. In
this view the marketplace alone should be able to handle the coming
adjustment, particularly for cases in which the elasticities of demand
substitution away from energy use may be substantial. We note,
however, that this is not always the case, and in such situations it is
appropriate for government conservation policies to provide a surrogate for market signals. For example, the demand for gasoline so far
has been notoriously insensitive to prices. During the several year
period when real prices for gasoline dropped after their initial rise
during the 1973-1975 embargo, the government stepped up its
efforts to control consumption by passing legislation aimed at increasing fuel efficiency of new cars.' 6 The government had asserted
its role in energy conservation, and chose this way to do so.
The question of what should be the governmental role in energy
conservation is indeed central. The National Academy of Sciences
study' I concluded that a limited government role is essential, given
the nature of the market. Energy markets have been politicized for
so long, there are so many nonmarket sociopolitical determinants of
energy supply and demand, and energy supply has become so vital to
national security, that an ideal competitive market is a fiction that
would not be tolerated politically even if in fact it could be attained.
The need for government participation is illustrated by the abundant
set of market failures that deter conservation of energy in buildings.' 8 These failures are aggravated by the widespread paucity of
information about the energy and economic consequences of various
behavioral and technological options.
Were the nation to be granted a very long time to adjust gradually
15. President Carter's Address to Congress on National Energy Plan, I PUB. PAPERS 663
(April 20, 1977); EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ENERGY POLICY AND
PLANNING, THE NATIONAL ENERGY PLAN (1977).
16. Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975, 42 U.S.C. § §6201-6422 (1976).
17. C.O.N.A.E.S.,supra note 6.
18. Institutional and Social Barriers to Residential Energy Conservation, supra note 9.
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to rising energy prices, a changing mix of available fuels, and increasingly serious environmental and social costs of energy production,
perhaps it would suffice to allow prices alone to guide consumption
decisions. Indeed, virtually every study of energy demand' 9 suggests
that given sufficient time and rising prices, demand growth will
slacken considerably and alter its tightly coupled short-term relationship to economic growth, just as happened in the past. But when
neither expensive new energy sources nor spontaneous changes in
demand patterns come about quickly enough to satisfy political goals
(such as the reduction of oil imports), it is necessary for government
to stimulate investments in conservation and supplies or to remove
barriers that prevent a "spontaneous" response of the marketplace.
NECPA appears to approach energy conservation from both directions.
II. RESIDENTIAL PROGRAM
This program, contained in Title II of the act,2 0 is built on several
principles, primarily: 1) homeowners lack adequate information to
carry out profitable conservation measures, 2) the economic good,
''conservation," cannot be bought easily because energy has declined
in price for decades, and 3) many people do not own or control the
structures they live in.
The act includes several provisions for low income weatherization
assistance. 2 1 Poor people have need for comfort (weatherization)
regardless of the price of energy, and this section plays an important
political role by attempting to include consideration of equity in an
energy package that otherwise allows prices to rise.
One significant element in the residential section of the act is
planning. States and individual utilities are instructed to prepare conservation plans, to undertake audits of energy use, and (along with
various federal agencies) to lend money to people who want to invest
in conservation. 2 2
Few would argue about the economic value of information. In
Sweden, community energy plans, including audits and inventories of
public buildings, have had a beneficial effect.2 I With full and timely
information, energy users should find ways of obtaining the same
19. These are best reviewed in Pindyck, Characteristicsof the Demand for Energy, in
ENERGY CONSERVATION AND PUBLIC POLICY 22 (J. Sawhill ed. 1979).
20. 42 U.S.C.A. § § 8211-8233 (Supp. 1979).
21. Id. § § 1474, 6862-6873 (Supp. 1979).
22. Id. § § 6321, 6325, 6327, 8213-8217.
23. Kommunala Energiplaneringen (Community Energy Planning), 1976, Stockholm:
Liberfoerlag.
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energy services for less energy, sometimes even without investment.
Figure 1 illustrates the shifted demand curve:
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FIGURE 1.
ECONOMIC VALUE OF INFORMATION IN SHIFTING THE
ENERGY DEMAND CURVE

Information about the slope of the demand curve for energy-related
amenities has great value too, for consumers reacting to higher prices
need to know where to "belt-tighten" so that their utility is maximized as energy prices rise.
To this end there is, in our view, a clear role for the suppliers of
energy and public authorities as well. Energy suppliers know their
markets thoroughly and are in a good position to understand the
nature of the uses of their products, whereas individual consumers
are unlikely to possess the requisite skills for making engineering
estimates. Public authorities can and should support efforts in which
costs are repaid rapidly with energy savings. There also are economies
of scale involved in centrally developing the requisite analytic and
educational tools, which may then be made broadly available at low
unit cost. Hence there is a role for both public and private institutions in providing energy information.
NECPA is strangely ambiguous about the role of utilities' energy
conservation. Section 21624 prohibits utilities from supplying or
financing conservation devices unless the value of the loan is less than
24. 42 U.S.C.A. §8217 (Supp. 1979).
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$300 (excluding major insulation or window retrofit) or the utility
was already selling such devices. (An example is the San Diego Gas
and Electric Company, whose office building has a large display of
conservation items that are on sale.) The motivation behind this
prohibition in NECPA is apparently to prevent utilities from somehow monopolizing the market for conservation devices.
In our view this constraint is short-sighted. Utilities forbidden
from selling conservation devices do not have as great an incentive to
promote efficient use of their product as do those for whom both
energy and conservation products offer acceptable rates of return.
Today the combination of rising marginal costs of generation capacity and fuel are straining many utilities. Selling insulation or window screens, for example, could reduce peak load more per dollar
invested than the addition of new capacity to meet peak demand. In
addition, giving utilities a greater role in conservation would probably clear up many of the uncertainties they have expressed in the
past about energy conservation.* ' Additional incentives to utilities
can be introduced if necessary, as, for example, the California Public
Utilities Commission's policy of relating allowable utility rate of
return to conservation activity at the utility. In short, utility participation in conservation activities could shortcut many existing institutional barriers to conservation in residential buildings.2 6
If a utility is already selling conservation, how is the program to be
financed under NECPA? Section 2152 7 mandates current expensing
of program costs, keeping them out of the rate base. Where such
activities lower total system costs (which is likely to be the case
because of rising marginal energy costs) the utility can charge the
costs to all customers. This makes good sense since the cost of not
conserving would ultimately be borne by all rate payers.
NECPA also sets many small restrictions on utility financing of
conservation. 2 These are probably reactions to the general mistrust
of energy companies that arose during the early 1970s when the
energy-environment debate heated up. Justified or not, the bureaucratic heavy-handedness of NECPA's utility program is a political
reality. Unfortunately, this reality could lead to higher administrative
costs rather than lower conservation costs.
But why "organize" conservation loans through utilities and government? The motivation appears to be a hope that some measure of
organization and regulation will speed up the process of adjusting to
25.
26.
27.
28.

THE TRANSITIONAL STORM, supra note 10.
Institutional and Social Barriers to Residential Energy Conservation, supra note 9.
42 U.S.C.A. §8216 (Supp. 1979).
42 U.S.C.A. § 8217 (Supp. 1979).
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higher prices. Wisely, in our view, NECPA does not mandate how
many units of a given product must be sold per year, but relies on
the marketplace, aided by the utility and government programs, to
determine the pace of this adjustment.
Should direct subsidies be employed to encourage conservation
and solar installations? Many economists would say no. Energy supply has been overburdened with subsidies in the past. However,
because the energy problem includes political and environmental
components not reflected in energy costs, and because conservation
and some alternative energy technologies offer clear environmental
benefits compared to conventional energy generation,2 9 there may
be a real advantage in encouraging these through indirect economic
means, for example, by influencing interest rates through tax incentives. This approach, however, is not incorporated into NECPA.
Title II (and other titles)3 0 requires that studies on residential and
related energy conservation opportunities be conducted. Significant
in the language (Section 253 b,c) 3' is an economic valuation of
conservation which indicates a recognition by Congress that energy
saved, per se, is not an end in itself. The language of Section 253 in
fact moves a long way towards recognizing that all resources are to
some degree scarce, so that economic attractiveness, not simply technical feasibility, shall be a prime element in any rulemaking that
influences energy use. Unfortunately it is possible that the proposed
rulemaking could significantly lessen the economic effectiveness of
standards or other regulations promoting conservation. This is a matter to which we point with some concern.
In summary, Title II attempts to organize and bring about the
financing of residential energy conservation measures. We find this
goal worthwhile in principle; the sums of public expenditures for
administration appear small in comparison with the tens of billions
spent yearly on utility services by households. The major problem
with Title II is that the mechanisms of financing its provisions appear
to be over-determined by the law.
III. PUBLIC BUILDINGS
Title II' 2 addresses the problems of energy conservation in public
buildings, including schools and hospitals. It has long been known
29. L. Schipper, Energy Conservation and the Environment, Conflict or Complement?
(1978) (report prepared for OECD Environmental Directorate, LBL-7883, Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, Berkeley).
30. 42 U.S.C.A. §6373 (Supp. 1979).
31. Id. § §8232-8233.
32. Id. § §300h-2, n-l(b)(2), n-l(c)(9), 6371-6372.
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that energy utilization in public buildings has been very inefficient
and could be improved considerably.' ' Lack of attention to energy
use in public buildings came about both because occupants of public
buildings do not pay the energy bills, and because most public entities have been constrained in the past to minimize first-year costs
rather than long-term costs (including energy). Because of this history, behavioral incentives and investment opportunities for energy
conservation are still lacking. It is appropriate now for the federal
government to make information and assistance available to public
institutions in need.
IV. ENERGY-EFFICIENCY STANDARDS
3

Title IV " contains the most controversial parts of NECPA: matters relating to energy efficiency standards. At the heart of the
matter is whether people and institutions, through the marketplace
alone, will make economically efficient decisions regarding the purchase of new energy-using equipment. The arguments favoring mandated efficiency standards are:
1) Consumers lack adequate information on energy costs, and producers generally do not provide such information;
2) Although investments often are foregone because the consumers'
discount rate is high, these investments may be profitable from
the point of view of society;
3) Because the phenomenon of rising marginal energy costs is recent, average energy costs to consumers are significantly less than
the costs of new supply. This means that even rational decision
making by consumers will lead to higher energy use than the
economic optimum from society's point of view. (This is a classic
problem with regulated industries, where actual prices rarely
approximate marginal prices).
Ideally, of course, efficiency standards would not be necessary if
energy were priced at the margin, if marketing techniques for autos,
homes and appliances did not obscure the energy implications of
purchase decisions, and if consumers and product suppliers had been
historically interested in efficiency. Then consumers would make
"right" decisions, conserve energy, and earn handsome economic
rewards. Unfortunately, as stated earlier, the real world is far from an
ideal marketplace, and the goals and means of public policy should
recognize this.
33. See, e.g., Schipper, Raising the Productivity of Energy Use, 1 ANN. REV. ENERGY
455 (1976).
34. 15 U.S.C.A. § §2006-2008,42 U.S.C.A. § §6293-6297,6303, 6305-6306,6308-6309,
6311-6317, 6344, 6346 (Supp. 1979).
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Another argument for governmental intervention is illustrated by
the case of the automobile. This is a situation in which the total cost
of the system is relatively independent of energy efficiency. The cost
per mile of autumobile transportation, taking account of fuel, capital
and maintenance costs, is remarkably independent of fuel efficiency
over a range from about 15 to 25 mpg, for fixed vehicle space and
performance." 5 From the consumer's point of view, then, he should
be relatively indifferent to the fuel efficiency in this range, yet from
a social perspective lowered gasoline consumption is favored
strongly. This illustrates that price and policy should contribute together to conservation; either alone may be ineffective. Put another
way, policy goals relating to the efficiency and structure of energy
use should be backed up by market forces.
But will mandated standards bring about economically rational
energy use? The answer in most cases is probably yes, but even for
the case of automobiles just discussed, such a result is not inevitable
because there are a number of values that influence car buying and
use, and prospects for continued real price rises for gasoline were not
seen until recently. Indeed, if there were a consensus that prices for
gasoline will remain constant through the 1980s as a result of controls, doubtless there would be great pressure to dilute the already
existing standards. Even more important, the marginal cost of driving
a 30 mpg car is usually less than that of a 15 mpg "guzzler," because
gasoline would cost less for the more efficient car. This would stimulate more driving, though not so much as to nullify all the savings
gained from a switch from a 15 mpg car to a 30 mpg car. Higher
prices, however, would slow or halt the increase in miles driven. 6
Fortunately, the discussion in Title II and Title IV (see e.g., Section 422)1 refers continually to "economic justification and impact" of each measure. The regulators will be confronted with the
value of market forces.
Title IV requires much analysis and determination of test and
compliance procedures before any action on standards is taken. Indeed, it is important that the designers of efficiency standards be
fully aware of the marginal costs of conservation so that they can
anticipate possible side effects of particular standards. Will businesses
or consumers suffer during a transition period'? Is compliance assured? Will a bureaucracy hold us to the adopted standards even
when better ones become possible? (Limiting window area in houses
'

35. C.O.N.A.E.S., supra note 6.
36. Schneider, A New Tax on Gasoline: Estimating Its Effect on Consumption, 202
SCIENCE 755, 757 (November 17, 1978).

37. 42 U.S.C.A. §6293 (Supp. 1979).
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or banning electric resistance heat, for example, might foreclose energy savings from passive solar designs). In our opinion, the experience of California suggests that building and appliance standards can
survive the long public debate and hearing procedure if they make
economic sense.
While it is too early to know how the final deliberations of the
U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) will come out concerning the
levels of standards, the analytic process of evaluating standards has
provided important lessons. Early in the process, little use was made
of economics in analyzing the levels of the standards.3 8 The result
was general disagreement on what constituted appropriate levels.
With the introduction of economics in the form of life-cycle costing,
an analytic tool was provided for setting standards: the goal is a
life-cycle cost minimum in which increased investment in conservation is offset by reduced fuel bills.' 9
Consideration of the details of the life-cycle cost curves also provides a rationale for a government role in stimulating energy conservation in buildings. For residential buildings these curves are flat:
that is, for a relatively wide range of conservation measures there is
little net change in the life-cycle cost to the consumer.4 0 Thus from
the consumer's point of view there may be little economic incentive
to build a very energy efficient house, even though the net costs of
doing so are small. However, from a national perspective, the benefits
of having houses built at the energy efficient end of the life-cycle
cost curve are substantial because of the large aggregate energy
savings that could be accomplished.
Significant problems may be encountered both in setting and in
implementing government standards. Traditionally, building standards have been prescriptive in nature. This means that specific individual components (e.g., R-38 ceiling insulation) are required by a
code, and deviation from these requirements is not permitted. The
standards being developed by DOE are novel both in that they are
performance standards, and because some flexibility is permitted in
determining a budget through life-cycle cost analysis. Although most
builders may prefer to follow the traditional prescriptive approach,
38. See, e.g., ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR CONSERVATION AND SOLAR APPLICATIONS, U.S. DEP'T OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT AND DEP'T OF
ENERGY, PHASE ONE/BASE DATA FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF ENERGY PERFORMANCE STANDARDS FOR NEW BUILDINGS (1978) (TID 28825).
39. BEPS Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, supra note 13.
40. This is shown in C.O.N.A.E.S., supra note 6. See also M. Levine et al., Economic
Analysis of Building Energy Performance Standards (1979) (Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory).
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the option of meeting the code in one of several ways should allow
for a variety of prescriptive approaches to be tried.
For energy efficiency standards to be effective it is important that
builders have enough information to install energy conservation
measures properly. Experiments conducted at Princeton and elsewhere have shown that poor building practice can effectively negate
the use of theoretically adequate conservation measures. 4 1 On the
other hand, the application of a building energy code at Davis, California, has shown that given proper information, builders can be
extremely effective in installing energy conservation measures in
houses (and in designing houses to conserve energy). 4 2 Thus, the role
of government in providing good information to builders could be
one of the most important facets of the standards process.
It is essential that government energy conservation legislation
encourage the development of new and innovative measures for reducing energy use in a cost effective manner-such as lower infiltration levels in houses or the use of passive solar designs-because the
benefits of these approaches could be very great. It is also important
that energy efficiency standards should be reviewed at specified
intervals to allow for the incorporation of new information.
Title IV also relates to industrial energy efficiency.' 3 Here the
concern is limited primarily to providing information, especially
labelling of equipment and testing of machines. While such information is vital to more efficient energy use, in many cases the information already exists. The performance efficiency of most industrial
machines has been assessed thoroughly, especially -from an energy
point of view, as industries have responded to the recent large increases in industrial energy prices.
At the present time, Congress has not attempted to dictate energy
efficiency for industrial operations, although NECPA leaves the door
open for standards on electric motors. There is ample evidence that
industrial energy use, particularly among heavy users, has been more
sensitive to price than that of other sectors, even in periods of low
energy prices. 4 4 Recent evidence 4 I shows that a marked reduction
41. Wotecki, Dutt & Beyea, The Two Resistance Models for Attic Heat Flow, 3 ENERGY 657 (1978).
42. E. Vine, Planning for an Energy Conserving Society: The Davis Experience (1979)
(report prepared by the Distributed Energy Systems Study Group, Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, Berkeley).
43. 42 U.S.C.A. § §6311-6317 (Supp. 1979).
44. Pindyck, supra note 19.
45. J. MYERS & L. NAKAMURA, SAVING ENERGY IN MANUFACTURING: THE
POST-EMBARGO PERIOD (1978).
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in energy use has taken place since 1973 in most energy intensive
industries, even with continuing use of existing equipment.
One important issue here is the appropriate discount rate for economic calculations involving industry. Typically industry requires
more than a 20 percent pre-tax rate of return on investments, particularly those not related to plant expansion. If society demands a
somewhat smaller return, should government subsidize conservation
among those who still have higher discount rates? In Sweden the
National Board of Industry has done so, paying up to 35 percent of
the investment for retrofitting existing equipment.4 6 Such subsidies
exist in this country in the form of tax credits. The Swedish program
has led to a savings of two to three percent of industry's energy use
since 1974 in addition to savings from private projects. Moreover,
some grants were rejected because the private rate of return was
deemed great enough without subsidy. That is, the Swedish program
had as its purpose the adjustment of the discount rate or time horizon so that society's overall investments in energy use and conservation might bring greater returns. Were these industrial investments
foregone, Swedish research and development or energy supply
monies would have been spent on more expensive energy.
Does this mean that massive government intervention is necessary
in order to speed progress in the industrial sector? We doubt that this
is necessary for several reasons. First, energy price changes in the
industrial sector have been dramatic, especially for natural gas and
electricity. In fact, these escalating costs have rendered much current
equipment obsolete in the energy intensive industries, in which most
industrial energy use is concentrated. Second, historical evidence
shows that industrial energy use was becoming more efficient even
while energy prices were declining, because of economies of scale and
technological advances. 4 7 In spite of the progress in reducing industrial energy intensities, however, it is not certain that the industrial
investment in energy conservation is "optimal," even from the point
of view of industry. This is partly because of the lack of data on
industrial energy use by end-use function. Still, we do not believe
that the federal government can or should require individual firms to
make a socially optimal investment to conserve energy. In our judgment, the appropriate role for government should be to provide information about industrial energy conservation opportunities, and
46. BOARD OF INDUSTRY, EVALUATION OF SUBSIDIES IFOR ENERGY CONSERVATION MEASURES IN INDUSTRY (1979) (Report SIND 1979:1, Stockholm, Liberf6erlag, in Swedish).
47. B. Carlsson, Introduction to Energy Conservation in Industry (1979) (prepared for
Project Proceed, Massachusetts Institute of Technology).
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tax incentives (or alternatively, taxes on energy) to stimulate investment in conservation (as investment in supply has been stimulated
historically). A primary justification for these measures is that industrial energy prices in the past were so low that energy was viewed by
many firms as essentially a "no cost" resource. Although the era of
low-cost energy has passed, the adjustment to higher prices may be
excessively painful for the nation without considerable leadership
from government. The measures of NECPA provide some useful
leadership, but much more could be done by government without
actually regulating energy use by individual industries.
Another NECPA measure 4 8 relates to the energy bonanza lying in
the greater use of recycled materials. This section mandates the setting of targets for recycling, including intensive study of the problem. In assessing the potential impact of this measure, it is necessary
to pay attention to the host of political problems that always seem
to arise in connection with legislation regarding materials and recycling.4
For making the millions of tons of throw-away waste
possible are low prices of virgin materials, continuing low energy
prices, and failure to internalize environmental costs into the costs of
basic materials processing. Unquestionably recovery of waste materials represents both an energy and an environmental bonus, but one
must acknowledge that the above-mentioned factors, acting through
the marketplace, inhibit the conservation of materials.
V. FEDERAL ENERGY INITIATIVES
Title VS 0 is concerned with federal energy initiatives. We applaud
the willingness of the federal government to stimulate development
of solar energy technologies, particularly through procurement policies. Audits of federal buildings are also suggested in Title V. The
fact is that the government's record thus far in "plugging leaks" in its
own house has been excellent.
However, there are two potential problems with Title V. First, it
demands life-cycle costing, which is admirable in principle. But, as
stated earlier, the results of life-cycle costing depend upon assumptions about energy prices, inflation, and discount rates (particularly
the latter). It is possible to select values for these factors in such a
way as to bias the results towards or away from the use of solar
energy. This suggests that political contests are even more likely to
be fought over this section of the act than over others.
48. 42 U.S.C.A. § §634 4 (a), 6346 (Supp. 1979).
49. T. PAGE, CONSERVATION AND ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY: AN APPROACH TO
MATERIALS POLICY (1977).
50. 42 U.S.C.A. §6361 (Supp. 1979).
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The other problem with procurement is that it may create premature support for particular technologies. Suppose that federal procurement of a certain kind of photovoltaic cell or thermal collector
were to put other ideas or concepts at a competitive disadvantage,
and later it was realized that the idea singled out for support had less
merit than presupposed. Such a sequence, caused by understandable
zeal to get the most hardware in place for the lowest cost, could lead
to the development of the wrong technology. Without a diversity of
efforts this risk is real. Fortunately, solar systems show a great potential for diversity. The challenge that is implicit in Title V is to make
use of this diversity, and to encourage the development of many
forms of the solar resource.
VI. OTHER PROVISIONS

Title VI begins with a section' 1 requiring continued reporting of
energy use by major corporations and large users. This is an information effort which is vital to careful energy planning.
The remaining parts of Title VI cover a variety of measures, including studies,' 2 increased funding for state energy conservation
plans' 3 (we applauded plans) and funding for an Office of Minority
Economic Impact in DOE.5 4 This last item bears comment. It is very
important that, in our desire to let market forces play a major role in
energy conservation, we not overlook the fact that there are many
people in this country who may feel severe economic pressures from
increases in energy costs and possibly from the implementation of
some conservation strategies, whether spontaneous or through government action. While these equity considerations should not be
taken as an argument to hold down the price of energy, there must
be full awareness of the pressing economic needs of these groups and
the political difficulties they have had in the past in influencing
policy. Politically, however, the implications of this section are clear:
the DOE and all other policy or rulemaking energy authorities must
know how their actions will affect all citizens. Failure to deal carefully and sincerely with the problems of minorities can doom legislation or other programs; accurate information and compensatory
measures, on the other hand, will allow energy policymaking to proceed much more smoothly.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Id. §6296.
23 U.S.C.A. §217, 42 U.S.C.A. § §6345, 6373 (Supp. 1979).
42 U.S.C.A. § §6321, 6325, 6327 (Supp. 1979).
Id. §7141.
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VII. LONGER TERM ISSUES

Is NECPA by itself adequate to meet the national needs for energy
conservation in the next few years? We believe not. NECPA involves
a number of compromises, which generally involve limited government action. Growing stresses on the United States and international
energy system suggests that NECPA, even if vigorously implemented,
may not prove adequate to dampen the increasing U.S. dependence
on imports sufficiently to avoid serious economic and political repercussions.
What NECPA and related legislation actually do is establish a
framework of rulemaking authority for regulations and incentives in
a number of important areas. Although the overall impact of the
program will depend on the outcome of many rulemaking decisions,
we believe that this impact probably will be relatively slight. Indeed,
the entire National Energy Act as submitted to Congress by the
President in 1977 was estimated to have a total impact by 1985 of
just 2.1 millions of barrels per day of oil equivalent, and the Congressional Budget Office analysis yielded even lower figures.' I The impact is impossible to calculate in detail, however, since NECPA primarily establishes authority to establish regulations rather than the
regulations themselves. Most of the rules are still to be made.
NECPA is a compromise package that indicates Congress has not
perceived a strong need for conservation. That this is the situation in
this country is indicated by the continuing political support for price
controls on oil and gas. Yet, even in the brief period since NECPA's
enactment, oil prices have escalated at a rate earlier thought improbable." 6 Gasoline prices of one dollar appeared in May of 1979.
These rapid changes lead us to question the adequacy of NECPA
as the primary legislative tool for dealing with the stresses relating to
energy use that the nation may face in the next few years. We express this concern in a series of questions which might be used as a
starting point for a discussion of potentially more effective legislation.
1) Is there justification for a national policy to encourage greater
symmetry of investment in supply expansion and end-use modera55. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, PRESIDENT CARTER'S ENERGY PROPOSAL: A PERSPECTIVE (January 1977) (052-070-04044-1).
56. Compare the forecasts made by the Energy Information Administration, published in
April 1979 but prepared earlier, with the present OPEC world oil prices. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, ENERGY SUPPLY AND DEMAND IN THE MIDTERM: 1985, 1990, 1995 (April 1979) (Report DOE/EIA/0102/52).
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tion? A number of analyses'7 have made it clear that investment
today in demand moderation generally is still substantially below
that which would be justified by economic analysis, based on the
concept that each marginal dollar should be invested where it will
bring the greatest return. A dollar should be invested in supply if it
buys the most there, or in demand if that is more cost effective. Such
an approach to energy conservation, if embedded in national policy,
could provide powerful guidance for establishing standards and incentives.
2) What are the social benefits of conservation? Conservation offsets negative social impacts of energy in many categories, for example in reducing land use for energy supply facilities and reducing
air pollution from combustion. Consideration should be given to
ways that these social benefits can be made explicit in conservation
legislation and standard setting.
3) What is the value to the United States of an avoided barrel of
imported oil? Oil imports contribute directly to inflation.' 8 Our
linkage by a long chain of oil tankers to a politically unstable region
of the world assures us of uncertainty of oil supply.
Under circumstances of this sort reduction of imports may have a
national security value that far exceeds the direct dollar cost of the
oil. This value is difficult to assess, however. The Harvard Energy
Study, reporting in a recent issue of Foreign Affairs, speculates that
the value may be two to three times the current price.5 9 Others find
it considerably lower,6" Three administrations and several U.S. Congresses have talked with the higher figure in mind but acted on the
basis of the lower one. Although we believe that national security
considerations would justify substantially stronger conservation policies than those of NECPA, we point out that these considerations
also have been invoked to promote more rapid development of highcost supplies.6 1
4) Should the government stimulate conservation and solar technologies more vigorously? The issue is especially relevant to the solar
57. C.O.N.A.E.S., supra note 6. See also Hatsopoulos et al., Capital, Investment to Save
Energy, 56 HARV. BUS. REV. 111 (1978).
58. HARVARD BUSINESS SCHOOL, ENERGY FUTURE: MANAGING AND MISMANAGING THE TRANSITION (R. Stobaugh & D. Yergin eds. 1979).
59. Stobaugh & Yergin, After the Second Shock: Pragmatic Energy Strategies, 57 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 836 (1979).
60. Pindyck, OPEC's Threat to the West, 30 FOREIGN POLICY 36 (1978). Pindyck
suggests that the free market price of oil, in the absence of the Cartel, would be significantly
lower than even the 1977 price, hence it would seem difficult to consider paying many tens
of dollars per barrel to avoid buying something that might only cost much less.
61. Numerous statements by Congressional leaders in the spring of 1979 in support of
the Synthetic Fuels proposals reflected this sentiment.
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industry. If energy prices continue to rise, there will eventually be a
large market for solar technologies. Although the solar industry has
expanded substantially in the past few years, it is still quite unstable.
One role of federal incentives is to help an industry to become economic in advance of the time when this would occur naturally. The
incentives offered under NECPA move in this direction, but only
slowly. The push of NECPA is very soft in comparison with the 55
percent solar tax credit that now exists in California; yet even with
this incentive, the use of solar systems is expanding only slowly in
California.6 2 We believe that NECPA is deficient in this area.
The government is also being asked to back many other fiigh-cost
ventures on the energy supply side. We stress here that the balance
between investment in high-cost fuels and electricity production and
in energy conservation technologies should take into account the
6
greater risks involved in the rapid'expansion of energy supplies. I
It would be prudent for the government to place highest priority
on backing measures designed to reduce energy demands that are
more immediate in impact, probably cheaper and ultimately cleaner,
while making best use of the additional time gained to solve the
many difficult problems plaguing our future supply alternatives.
5) Are oil and gas scarce? They are scarce in the sense that the
historically low prices paid for them today still inhibit both their
production and the tremendous potential for end-use conservation at
higher fuel prices. Much of the language of the act and its predecessors, as well as the debate within DOE, tends to emphasize saving
"scarce" oil and gas, especially by replacing these fuels with electricity. It should be pointed out that oil and gas can be saved at less
cost per unit by end-use conservation than by substitution of electricity. 6 4 Although we do not foresee an endless supply of oil and
gas at rising prices, we do see the prospects for conservation of these
fuels as bright enough to prolong their economic usefulness to society for heat and power well into the next century, provided that a
serious conservation program is pursued continuously over the
coming decades and that prices rise to reflect the relative scarcity of
these fuels.
62. STATE OF CALIFORNIA, FIFTY-FIVE PERCENT SOLAR TAX CREDIT (April
1978) (AB 3623); Communications with California Energy Commission, Solar Office, Diana
Rains (July 1979).
63. COMMITTEE ON NUCLEAR AND ALTERNATIVE ENERGY SYSTEMS, REPORT OF THE PANEL ON RISK (to be published by the National Research Council,
National Academy of Sciences, Washington, D.C. 1979).
64. See, e.g., A. Rosenfeld, Some Potentials for Energy and Peak Power Saving in California (October 1977) (LBL-5926, Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, Berkeley) published in
PROCEEDINGS OF INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON ENERGY USE MANAGEMENT (1977).
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6) In what other ways could the federal government play a significant leadership role in encouraging energy conservation? We have
seen that NECPA promotes three major roles for the government in
energy conservation: setting of energy standards, disseminating information about energy conservation opportunities, and assisting operators of federal buildings. Tax policy is another instrument that is
likely to be consistent with our general framework of employing
cost-effective conservation measures largely through the operation of
market forces. The issue of whether the tax laws discriminate against
industrial energy conservation is important. In industry, money spent
on fuel serves to reduce profits, which are taxed directly. However
investment in conservation is a capital outlay and is taxed accordingly. Since conservation and fuel use compete directly the different
tax treatment of the two can lead to market signals that are not
appropriate. This issue requires considerable analysis and is a proper
area for future legislation.
An appropriate activity of the federal government regarding conservation is research and development. Because many conservation
measures (e.g., more efficient electric motors) may have diffuse
applications throughout the economy, private sector research and
development is often very limited, and in these areas governmentsponsored programs could make an important contribution. The
emphasis of federal energy conservation research and development
should be related directly to the potential contribution that conservation could make to reducing future energy supply problems.
Another area worthy of investigation is the strategy of the government with respect to commercial implementation of new conservation measures. Although the government has devoted considerable
attention to the possibility of purchasing solar energy equipment to
stimulate the market response to these new technologies, little attention has been given to similar programs for energy conservation.
Many novel energy conservation measures are close to commercial
readiness and might benefit considerably from an assist from the
federal government. Purchase programs, testing and certification,
effective information transfer, and other means are available as alternatives for the government in encouraging commercial use of costeffective energy conservation measures.
To summarize our evaluation of NECPA, we find three major
characteristics:
1. The principles of energy conservation legislation, while still
typically vague, have evolved to recognize more explicitly the economic nature of energy use and conservation. NECPA makes a step
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(unfortunately, far too small) along this course. But no legislation,
strong or weak, can succeed unless market signals support it.
2. The specific measures of NECPA are generally mild. They are,
however, roughly consistent with the reservations many people had
in 1977 and 1978 about the need to let energy prices rise. But prices
rose dramatically in the first two quarters of 1979. This sequence
always will make it difficult to assess how much conservation was
"caused" by a relatively mild act of Congress, and how much developed anyway because prices increased.
3. Some of the measures of NECPA are questionable or difficult
to understand; some reflect old political battles; some leave the door
open to enlightened-or misguided-manipulation through the rulemaking process. Ultimately the provisions of NECPA probably reflect the feeling in Congress and the White House that something of
apparent substance had to come out of the 18-month energy debate
without that debate ever really having been resolved. The clouds
have gathered again, with long lines at some gasoline pumps and
fingers pointing blame in many directions. If these clouds have a
silver lining, it may be the greater understanding that is developing of
the need for and nature of energy conservation as an important step
in resolving the nation's energy problem.

